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We start from the assertion that a useful monetary policy design should be founded on
more realistic assumptions about what policymakers can know at the time when policy
decisions have to be made. Since the Taylor rule – if used as an operational device -
implies a forward looking behaviour, we analyze the reliability of the input information.
We investigate the forecasting performance of OECD projections for GDP growth rates
and inflation. We diagnose a much better forecasting record for inflation rates compared
to GDP growth rates, which for most countries are almost uninformative at the time a
Taylor rule should sensibly be applied. Using this data set, we find significant
differences between Taylor rules estimated over revised data compared to real-time
data. There is evidence that monetary policy seems to react more actively in real time
than rules estimated over revised data suggest.
Given the evidence of systematic errors in OECD forecasts, in a next step we attempt to
correct for these forecast biases and check to which extent this can lower the errors in
interest rate policy setting. An ex-ante simulation for the years 1991 to 2001 supports
the proposal that correcting for forecast errors and biases based on an error model can
lower the resulting policy error in interest rate setting for most countries under
consideration. In addition we investigate to what extent structural changes in the policy
reaction behaviour can be handled with moving instead of expanding samples.
Our results point out that the information set available needs a careful examination
when applied to instrument rules like those of the Taylor type. Limited forecast quality
and significant data revisions recommend a more sophisticated handling of the dated
information, for which we present an operational procedure that has the potential of
reducing the risk of severe policy errors.
Keywords: Monetary policy rules, economic forecasting, OECD, real-time data
JEL-Classification: C53, C82, E52Non-Technical Summary
Monetary policy formulation, evaluation and interpretation by means of simple policy
rules, as for instance the popular Taylor rule, have attracted much attention in recent
years. Such rules have not only been viewed as guidelines to (the transparency of)
policy decisions, but also as benchmarks for predicting future policy and as a tool to
judge whether current or past policy has been appropriately set.
It has been pointed out, however, that the results of such a procedure will be misleading,
if policy reaction functions, whose parameters are estimated on the basis of preliminary
or final data, are used for understanding how policymakers react to real-time data,
which are still subject to revisions (Orphanides, 2001). The problem is aggravated by
the fact that in monetary policy the necessity to take into account long lags leaves the
policymaker with only forecasts for the variables entering his reaction function.
In order to obtain a better understanding for real-time data issues we evaluate accuracy
and efficiency of OECD’s forecasts for the G7 countries, paying attention to ex-post
data revisions. Apart from a rather disappointing forecast performance for GDP over
horizons of more than one year, we identify significant biases in the forecasts and a
rather different behavior among countries as to data revisions. Applied to Taylor rules,
we find significant differences between rules estimated over revised data as compared to
those estimated over real-time data that are still subject to later revisions.
Furthermore we try to evaluate potential policy errors caused by erroneous and biased
forecasts and we suggest methods to correct forecasts and preliminary data for some of
these defects, thus enabling policymakers to use more efficiently the information set
available at a certain moment of time. We propose procedures to control for distorting
influences on the rule’s dated data input and show that policy errors can be reduced.
Generally, however, our results support skepticism against the use of simple
instrumental rules in practical monetary policy, mainly because they imply large policy
errors if they are based on unadjusted real-time input data.Nicht-technische Zusammenfassung
Formulierung, Evaluierung und Interpretation von Geldpolitik mit Hilfe einfacher
Politikregeln, wie z.B. der Taylor-Regel, haben in den letzten Jahren große
Aufmerksamkeit erfahren. Solche Regeln werden nicht nur als Richtlinien für
geldpolitische Entscheidungen, sondern auch zur Vorhersage von Maßnahmen und zur
Beurteilung der Frage verwendet, ob eine bestimmte Politik über einen zu
untersuchenden Zeitraum angemessen war oder nicht.
Es wurde jedoch darauf hingewiesen, dass eine Vorgehensweise irreführend sein kann,
bei der geldpolitische Reaktionsfunktionen, die über mehrfach revidierte oder
„endgültige“ Daten geschätzt wurden, zur Beschreibung des Verhaltens von
Geldpolitikern in konkreten Entscheidungssituationen verwendet werden, in denen nur
vorläufige Daten und Prognosewerte zur Verfügung stehen (Orphanides, 2001).
Wir evaluieren die Prognosen der OECD für die G7-Länder hinsichtlich ihrer
Treffsicherheit und Effizienz, wobei wir insbesondere auch die nachträglich erfolgenden
Datenrevisionen beobachten. Abgesehen von einer eher enttäuschenden
Prognosequalität für das BIP über Horizonte von mehr als einem Jahr finden wir auch
signifikante Verzerrungen in den Prognosen sowie ein offenkundig unterschiedliches
Verhalten der einzelnen Länder gegenüber Datenrevisionen. Für die Schätzung von
Taylor-Regeln impliziert dies naturgemäß deutliche Unterschiede, je nachdem, ob über
Echtzeit- oder ex-post-Daten geschätzt wird.
Desweiteren versuchen wir, den potentiellen Politikfehler zu evaluieren, der durch
ungenaue und verzerrte Prognosen verursacht wird, und wir schlagen Methoden vor, mit
deren Hilfe diese Datenfehler korrigiert werden können, damit die Geldpolitik größeren
Nutzen aus dem zum konkreten Zeitpunkt zur Verfügung stehenden Datenkranz ziehen
kann. Wir zeigen, dass geeignete Verfahren zur Reduzierung des potentiellen
Politikfehlers gefunden werden können. Im allgemeinen jedoch unterstützen unsere
Ergebnisse den Skeptizismus gegenüber der unkritischen und mechanischen
Anwendung der einfachen Instrumentenregel, da sie bei Anwendung auf unkorrigierte
Datensätze erhebliche Politikfehler impliziert.Contents
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Forecast Quality and Simple Instrument Rules -
A Real-Time Data Approach
*)
There is a long tradition of Austrian, or neo-Austrian,
economics within which the scope for policy action




The future is uncertain – and there are few indications that our capabilities to
reduce uncertainty by econometric forecasting have increased: An evaluation of OECD
forecasts does not show any significant improvement of forecast accuracy over the
course of the last thirty years1, though we admit that it could be argued that over this
period “reality” has become more complex and more difficult to forecast.
To degrees differing over the history of economic thought, economists have
always been aware of uncertainty. Recently, methodological concerns have put new and
increased emphasis on the issue of uncertainty in economics. Dow (2002), for instance,
asks for the justification of policy actions, if their outcome is uncertain. Uncertainty is
not only a property of the real world, she argues, but also a property of our knowledge
about the real world. Economists, thus, have an uncertain view about economic actors,
which themselves hold uncertain views about the real world, and support policymakers
in influencing the economic process with uncertain results.
This is the framework in which monetary policy operates; even worse, it operates
on long and variable lags, implying that current policy decisions are made on the basis
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1 See Glück, Schleicher and Catena (2000). We want to point out that it is not our intention to blame
anybody for deficiencies of forecast quality. It is our intention to learn from the observed problems and
try to develop procedures to improve upon them.2
of assumptions and forecasts about the state of the economy in the future rather than on
the basis of the actual state. When current policies are chosen, policymakers are
uncertain about the state of the economy which is to prevail at the time the planned
policy is expected to impact.
For the discretionary case, Cukierman and Gerlach (2003) have recently shown
that an inflation bias could be caused by the simple existence of uncertainty in case of
asymmetric attitudes of the central bank towards positive or negative forecast errors
even if the desired level of employment is equal to its normal level. For policy under
commitment, the literature on policy rules and, especially, on forecast-based rules,
brought the problem of forecast quality and reliability even more to the forefront. Some
authors found that such forecast-based rules seem to be able to control better for current
and future inflation (Batini and Haldane, 1999). Ex post, however, forecasts might turn
out to be quite wrong, mostly if forecasts for national account data enter the rule (as in
the case of flexible inflation targeting), implying policy error and welfare losses.
Orphanides (2001) has pointed out that “(t)he discussion (on monetary policy
rules)… often does not place proper emphasis on the informational problem associated
with some of the advocated policy rules.” Taking into account that the policymaker
when making a decision has at his disposal only forecast values for the arguments
entering his reaction function, Orphanides argues that the weights attached to these
arguments when estimated by means of “realised” or revised data could be rather
misleading. A voluminous literature on “real-time issues” was elicited by this
observation, and there is an ongoing debate about its implications. Thus far, the
evidence on whether it really matters if a central bank uses real-time data or final data is
not yet clear. Orphanides (2001) finds that revisions of recommendations tend to be
“very large” comparing results from these two data sets, whereas Adema (2003) for
“quasi-real time” data, Bernanke and Boivin (2000) and others cannot find much
difference.
On more basic grounds, however, Svensson (2003) has judged simple
instrumental rules as “inadequate as a description of real-world inflation targeting” and
even their use as mere guidelines as “incomplete and too vague to be operational”. For
the prescriptive case, we try to show that insufficient forecast quality and the fact of3
frequent and significant data revisions imply high uncertainty concerning the parameters
to be used in such rules, thus increasing potential policy error.
There seems to be a complex set of errors and mistakes which threaten to be
incurred if monetary policy rules, whose parameter values are obtained from estimation
over “final” data from the past, are applied to real-time decisions. We see at least three
sources of such potential mistakes:
-  Forecast uncertainty: The policymaker wishing to influence some future
outcome in an optimal sense has, as mentioned, at his disposal only forecasts for
the period in question. These forecasts may be wrong and the mistake usually is
the larger the longer the forecast horizon is. Thus, for the sensible application of
a monetary policy rule, it has to be asked which the forecast horizon is starting
from which the forecast performance shows some reliability.
-  Forecast bias: Errors do not sum up to zero over time, but in many cases
forecasts can be shown to be severely biased. If such biases can be identified, is
it possible and does it make sense to correct for them in order to bring the
policymaker’s real-time decision closer to “reality”?
-  Data revisions: In some cases – apart from the fact of significant revisions –,
there seem to exist systematic components in the revision process. Again, if
identifiable, they could be incorporated into some correction mechanism.
Neglecting these errors may render Taylor rules estimated over revised data
practically irrelevant for real-time decisions and may lead to an interest rate setting
consistently too high or too low with high costs incurred by such policy errors.
However, by closer examination of OECD forecasts it seems possible to obtain some
estimates of the size and evolution of these mistakes by evaluating forecasts over longer
periods, by calculating the forecast errors over changing forecast horizons, by
investigating for biases, and by observing the ex-post data revisions. If successful, the
policy error incurred by a “final-data Taylor rule” when applied to real-time decisions
can be enumerated and procedures can be developed to correct for these distortions.
The outline of the paper is as follows: In section 2 we explain the content of our
data base, quantify forecast errors and biases. In section 3 we show the difference
between „real-time data“ and „last reported data” Taylor rules and we experiment with4
different procedures to improve the information content of data available in the real-
time situation. Finally, in section 4 we draw the conclusions.
2.  Dynamics and Bias in Forecasting
There is a vast literature on the evaluation of forecast accuracy trying to
discriminate between models based on their relative forecasting record. Although this
seems to be potentially an objective criterion, considerable difficulties remain
nonetheless.
The first difficulty inherent in such an exercise relates to the measurement of
forecast quality. What should be the appropriate metric? As regards quantitative
measures, there are many to choose from – absolute errors, root mean square errors,
Theil’s U, etc. Similarly, a number of qualitative measures are available; for instance,
we might be interested in correctly predicting turning points. Furthermore, it is widely
acknowledged that accurate short-run forecasts are better made by small time series or
reduced form models than by structural relations. Such time series models, however,
have limited economic content. Policy institutions, by contrast, typically value the
economic content of a forecast and the forecast “story”, since it facilitates internal and
external communication and allows them to conceptualise risks and scenarios around
the forecast.
Second, even if we assume that some suitable forecasting metric can be found,
there still remains the question of how one interprets and makes use of that metric. For
example, over which horizon do we judge performance? Results will inevitably differ at
different forecast horizons. Moreover, ex-post data revisions will change those errors.
Indeed, even if we can identify the best (ex-post) performer, there is no guarantee that
this will extrapolate into the future. It should also be borne in mind that small forecast
failure does not necessarily imply that the model is well-specified; the forecast error is a
compound of different errors – specification (i.e. model) errors, errors in residual
adjustment and errors in exogenous assumptions, and it is not clear how to disentangle
these different aspects. For many projection exercises, the outcome is a combination of
model and off-model judgment.5
Recent papers
2, however, conclude that more serious problems seem to be
involved in forecasting than the simple problem of accuracy, namely bias, rationality
and efficiency as well as the problem of data revisions. It is found that efficiency (e.g. in
terms of bias and variance) does not seem to be guaranteed, as shown for instance by
Joutz and Stekler (2000) as well as by Loungani (2000), and obviously there are
extended periods of bias towards systematic over- or underestimation. Whereas Joutz
and Stekler in their study of the Fed forecasts find that on average these were unbiased,
Loungani (2000) in his investigation on private sector forecasts finds evidence of an
upward bias. These results relate predominantly to GDP forecasts, but generally they
also apply to previsions of inflation.
In the following, we put special emphasis on the dynamic aspects of the
forecasting and data revision processes and on biases as this will provide us with a data
base appropriate to deal with some of the problems discussed above. For this purpose,




Since the sixties, the OECD in its Economic Outlook has been publishing
forecasts for some of its member countries. Projections for the major macroeconomic
aggregates are published twice a year, one in June (mid-year forecast) and one in
December (end-year forecast). Originally, the first forecast for a particular year was the
mid-year forecast one year ahead. This has been extended in the late seventies to the
end-year forecast two years ahead. Thus, for instance, the first forecast for 2006 is
published in December 2004.
We analyze the gross domestic product (GDP) and consumer price forecasts, both
in rates of change, for the G7 countries (USA, Japan, Germany, United Kingdom,
France, Italy and Canada). The basic data for this study were taken from every
published Economic Outlook since 1967. The evolution of forecasts for the particular
                                                
2 A more elaborate review of this literature was given in Glück, Schleicher and Catena (2000).
3 An alternative way would have been to investigate the forecasts of national institutes. However, in most
countries there exists more than one institution producing forecasts – so which one to choose? We
preferred to use the data base of a highly respected international institution which supposedly also
bases its projections on consensus based approaches.6
years as well as the data revisions constitute the data base which is analyzed. That sums
up to nine estimates (one two-year-ahead estimate, two one-year-ahead, two current
year and two estimates each one year and two years after) for every country. These
estimates are compared to the final data, where “final” still means preliminary and
should be better termed “last reported” since many countries continue their data
revisions. The final data in this study are the last reported values for every year that
were published in late 2003.
For several reasons, these forecasts are tempting for a thorough analysis. First, the
forecasting process in this institution obviously takes into account a lot of national and
international information, and political influence cannot be fully excluded. Second, the
sequence of these forecasts provides a good documentation of the gradual revisions of
the forecasts, since five semi-annual revisions for the predictions of a particular year are
available. Third, a very special feature of this data base is the documentation of the data
revision process that follows afterwards which can be traced over four additional
estimates (revisions) of the data for a particular year.
Some examples of this sequence of forecasts and data revisions are shown in
Figures 1 to 3 for the evolution of GDP rates and inflation rates from the OECD data set
and for comparison from IMF. As a first impression we observe large adjustments in the
GDP forecasts, but much more stability in the inflation predictions.
This data base offers the possibility to investigate
-  if there is an improvement of forecasting accuracy over the sample period and in
the data revision process
4,
-  if regularities in forecasts and data revisions can be used to adjust the
preliminary data in order to obtain estimates that are closer to the final data and
-  if there are major differences with respect to the quality of forecasts among the
G7 countries.
                                                
4 This was extensively analysed in Glück, Schleicher and Catena (2000). No improvement in forecast
quality over time could be diagnosed.7
2.2 Forecast and Revision Dynamics
Formally, we observe the evolution of the value for a variable y at time t for
which information is available at time t-τ . We talk about
  forecasts if τ  = 0, 1, 2, …
and about
  data revisions  if τ  = -1, -2, …
In the following we will deal with both cases symmetrically and denote estimates
for a particular variable y at time t based on information at t-τ   by 
e
t t y τ − | .
The relationship between the actual (last reported) value of variable  t y and the
estimate made at different periods τ   before (forecast) or after period t (data revision)
e
t t y τ − | and the corresponding estimation error τ − t t e | is
Fehler! Es ist nicht möglich, durch die Bearbeitung von Feldfunktionen
Objekte zu erstellen.=
e
t t y τ − | +Fehler! Es ist nicht möglich, durch die Bearbeitung
von Feldfunktionen Objekte zu erstellen.,   τ  = -2, -1, 0, 1, 2.  (1)
The Tables A.1 and A.2 in the Annex report the error analysis for relation (1). For rates
of change of GDP and of consumer price deflators, various vintages of dated
measurements and last reported values are compared for the G7 countries, using the
following country abbreviations: United States (USA), Japan (JPN), Germany (DEU),
United Kingdom (GBR), France (FRA), Italy (ITA) and Canada (CAN). The rows in
the tables refer to the dates when the corresponding estimates (predictions or data
revisions) were published.
The general impression we get from Tables A.1 and A.2 corresponds to what we
would expect as to forecast errors which improve with the age of an estimate. But it
may not be that well-known that the data revision process continues with remarkably
pronounced errors over more than two years after the date a forecast belongs to. The
precision of the inflation forecast is at the beginning of the forecast sequence higher
than for GDP growth.8
Figure 1:  OECD forecasts and data revisions:
GDP USA
Figure 2: IMF forecasts and data revisions:
GDP USA
Figure 3: OECD forecasts and data revisions:
Consumer prices USA

























































































































































































As to GDP, all countries seem to have a tendency of starting with an
overestimation, except the USA. More details will be revealed in the error model which
we will present below. For the United States we discover a substantial and systematic
underestimation both during the forecast as well as the data revision period. Quite the
reverse holds true for Japan. This country’s GDP is systematically overestimated (as
indicated by negative average errors) in both periods. Compared to this, Germany and
France show very different error behaviour: They start with an overestimation of the
GDP growth rates but the errors quickly converge to zero and stay there. This means
that both countries hardly revise their data afterwards
5. Italy and the United Kingdom
start out with overestimates in their first forecasts but keep underestimating during
forecast and data revisions. A similar behaviour is exhibited by Canada with a
pronounced overestimation of its first forecast.
2.3 Error Model of Dated Estimates
Next we investigate the relationship between dated estimates for forecasts and
data revisions and the last reported values by specifying the following error model:
τ τ − − + + = t t
e
t t t u y b b y | | 1 0    τ  = -2, -1, 0, 1, 2 (2)
Thus we estimate the linear relationship between the final (last reported) series  t y
and its dated estimates 
e
t t y τ − | , covering both forecasts (if τ   = 2, 1, 0) and data revisions
(if τ   = -1, -2).
We use model (2) to test the joint hypothesis that the coefficients b0 and b1 do not
differ significantly from 0 and 1, respectively, and that there is no serial correlation in
the errors, as is required for efficiency and unbiasedness. In addition, we would expect
that the sequence of these regressions shows a converging behaviour both with respect
to the parameters b0 and b1, the improvement of the overall fit (as reported by R
2) and a
lowering of serial correlation (indicated by the DW statistic). The results of these
regressions for GDP forecasts are reported in Tables A.3 and A.4 in the Annex.
                                                
5 It remains open if this is to be interpreted as proof of an excellent quality of the data generating process
or rather as neglect of information coming up later.10
A summary of these results expressed by the multiple coefficient of correlation is
contained in Tables 1.
Obviously the forecast performance for the inflation rate is far superior to the
GDP rates which up to the end-year forecast one year ahead do not seem to convey
predictive information.
Table 1a:  Error analysis for dated estimates of GDP
Source: Calculated from OECD Economic Outlook
Table 1b:  Error analysis for dated estimates of consumer prices
Source: Calculated from OECD Economic Outlook
Thus the error model confirms that the first and second forecasts obviously carry
no useful information for future GDP growth. There is convergence towards b0 = 0 and
b1 = 1, but only very late in the revision period and not in the forecasting phase.
Since all estimates starting with the one-year ahead forecast produced at the end
of that year show a significant relationship between estimated data and last reported
 
USA JPN DEU GBR FRA ITA CAN
2 ys. ahead (end)  0,525 0,731 0,707 0,711 0,579 0,575 0,683
1 y.  ahead  (mid)  0,780 0,750 0,537 0,649 0,930 0,941 0,894
1 y.  ahead  (end)  0,850 0,865 0,760 0,884 0,956 0.939 0,936
Current year (mid) 0,987 0,931 0,915 0,906 0,984 0.983 0,962
Current year (end) 0,980 0,929 0,943 0,960 0.992 0,992 0,985
1 y.  after  (mid)  0.979 0,947 0,940 0,976 0,995 0,992 0,983
1 y.  after  (end)  0,977 0,945 0,936 0,981 0,994 0,994 0,982





USA JPN DEU GBR FRA ITA CAN
2 ys. ahead (end)  0,000 0,012 0,050 0,108 0,287 0,100 0,185
1 y.  ahead  (mid)  0,191 0,071 0,000 0,068 0,035 0,000 0,110
1 y.  ahead  (end)  0,587 0,584 0,428 0,408 0,516 0,416 0,423
Current year (mid) 0,804 0,779 0,769 0,853 0,747 0,627 0,734
Current year (end) 0,883 0,920 0,898 0,871 0,929 0,821 0,837
1 y.  after  (mid)  0,900 0,954 0,915 0,909 0,908 0,889 0,905
1 y.  after  (end)  0,947 0,950 0,919 0,919 0,936 0,898 0,914




data this fact can be exploited for improving both the dated forecasts and the data
revisions in order to obtain combined estimates that come closer to the final series. This
pattern holds for all G7 countries.
Thus, the impression gained from visual inspection of Figures 1 to 3 is confirmed
by the error model: The forecast record for GDP growth rates is quite disappointing.
The first two published forecasts contain hardly any useful information as to the last
reported values.
Estimates for inflation rates, however, are much more accurate than estimates for
GDP growth. The end-year inflation forecast two years ahead captures on average more
than 50% of the variance of the last reported data. This means that inflation forecasts
contain more useful information that can be incorporated into monetary policy rules.
Thus, in the following we will concentrate mainly on the GDP forecasts, as they seem to
be the source of larger potential errors than the inflation forecasts.
3.  Overcoming Real-Time Data Problems in the Case of Taylor Rules
Given these data problems, a policymaker faces two options for dealing with the
phenomenon of real-time data:
-  to apply parameter values of instrument rules which are estimated from real-time
data, or
-  to correct real-time data for the known deficiencies like forecasting  and revision
errors - if they can be identified - and structural breaks and to re-estimate
parameter values of instrument rules accordingly.
In this section we demonstrate operational procedures for overcoming the problem
of dated information which characterizes real-time data in the case of Taylor rules.
3.1 The Impact of Dated Information on the Parameters of Taylor Rules
We want to investigate to what extent central bankers behave differently in
applying simple instrument rules whether there is a real-time situation or an ex-post
information set. Or, put differently, how would policy reactions change if parameter
values gained from last reported data were applied instead of those from real-time data?12
In order to investigate this, we estimate Taylor rules using forecast values as
arguments. Thus, we regress the short-term interest rate of the current period on the
forecasts made a certain time span ahead. As indicated, however, GDP forecasts over
horizons of more than one year are of no predictive value; therefore, we estimate Taylor
rules based on one-year-ahead forecasts for GDP and inflation. In addition we apply
interest-rate smoothing by including the lagged interest rate, i.e. we regress




t t t u r y p r α α α α ,( 3 )
with 
e
t t p 1 | − being the inflation rate for year t forecast at time t-1, 
e
t t y 1 | −  being the forecast
output gap for the next year (defined as the difference between forecast GDP growth
and smoothed GDP growth as a measure for potential GDP growth). We use equation
(3) to generate a forecast for the short-term interest rate  1 | − t t r  in period t by using the
forecasts for GDP and inflation available in period (t-1) for period t
6.
The results for Taylor rules using one-year-ahead forecasts are summarized in
Table 2a. This ex-post analysis indicates that for all G7 countries current year’s short-
run interest rates are significantly related to inflation forecasts made at the end of the
preceding year. The size of the estimated coefficients varies between 0.4 and 1.4. The
impact of the same dated predictions for GDP gap on short-run interest rates is
obviously much weaker and only significant for Japan and United Kingdom.
The estimation results for the same Taylor rule specification but with last reported
values are contained in Table 2b. We recognize that the significance of the inflation rate
increases. As to the GPD gap, in contrast to the estimates based on predictions, the
United States and Germany show significant impacts, but the United Kingdom does not.
Compared to the final data rules, as reported in Table 2b, we recognize that in the
real-time data rules of Table 2a the reaction to the inflation rate in most cases is
somewhat stronger (though not always statistically significant), whereas for the real-
time output gap the significance is reduced. The coefficients on the lagged interest rates
suggest that the desire to keep the interest rate stable seems somewhat stronger than in
the final data case.
                                                
6 Given the high error in GDP forecasts, we do not invest more sophistication into the calculation of the
output gap.13
Table 2a  Historical evidence of Taylor rules
estimated with end-year forecasts one year ahead
Source: Own calculations based on data from OECD Economic Outlook, 1980-2001.
Table 2b  Historical evidence of Taylor rules
estimated with last reported values
Source: Own calculations based on data from OECD Economic Outlook, 1980-2001.
These results seem to point in the direction that central banks in real-time react
more actively to deviations in inflation from their targets than rules estimated over final
data would suggest, whereas the reaction to deviations in output in most cases seems
less significant than for final data.
Thus, it is confirmed that parameters of estimated Taylor rules are rather sensitive
with respect to dated sample information. In addition there is evidence from CUSUM
tests about structural changes.
3.2 The Handling of Dated Information in the Context of Taylor Rules
We are proposing therefore a procedure which attempts to deal with a real-time
policy decision environment that takes into account both the aspect of dated sample
information and structural changes in the policy reaction behaviour.
As to the difficulties with dated sample information we propose two types of
sample strategies:
a 1 t 1 a 2 t 2 a 3 t 3 a 4 t 4
USA 0,973 4,07 -0,377 1,33 0,406 2,66 0,697 0,82 0,847 0,97
Japan 0,796 4,79 -0,580 2,40 0,541 4,83 1,522 2,56 0,895 2,07
Germany 1,394 3,07 -0,302 0,88 0,321 1,45 0,676 0,67 0,709 1,45
United Kingdom 0,789 4,19 -1,078 2,90 0,604 3,75 -0,060 0,04 0,817 1,03
France 0,358 3,04 -0,102 0,24 0,656 4,07 1,229 1,17 0,870 1,72
Italy 0,520 3,83 -0,399 0,98 0,625 5,58 0,956 0,94 0,915 1,87
Canada 1,250 3,37 -0,111 0,19 -0,057 0,17 3,665 1,97 0,742 1,44
Country




a 1 t 1 a 2 t 2 a 3 t 3 a 4 t 4
USA 0,874 7,42 -0,417 3,34 0,514 5,95 0,278 0,52 0,930 1,76
Japan 0,875 4,67 -0,380 2,26 0,481 3,83 1,548 2,88 0,883 2,28
Germany 0,949 5,02 -0,551 2,86 0,500 3,75 0,993 1,46 0,826 1,64
United Kingdom 0,610 4,81 -0,310 1,30 0,457 3,35 1,834 1,51 0,841 1,38
France 0,368 4,07 -0,146 0,53 0,649 5,32 1,210 1,46 0,895 1,63
Italy 0,362 5,07 -0,700 0,24 0,667 6,84 0,709 0,80 0,928 1,97
Canada 0,912 3,77 -0,132 0,44 0,229 0,85 2,650 1,64 0,782 1,74
Country
Inflation GDP gap Lagged dep. var. Constant
R
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-  The unadjusted sample only deals with last reported values but neglects the most
recent four values because of the evidence of major data revisions.
-  The adjusted sample also deals with last reported values but replaces the most
recent four values by estimates from the measurement error model. This means
that the preliminary values for these values are replaced by bias-corrected
values.
As to the difficulties with structural changes we are also dealing with two types of
sample strategies:
-  Expanding samples start with a first sample 1980-1990 and expand in annual
increments to the final sample 1980-2000.
-  Moving samples start with a first sample 1980-1990 and move in annual
increments with 11 years sample sizes to the final sample 1990-2000.
For both types of samples, based on the estimated parameters, the one-period
outside sample forecast for the short-term interest rate from 1991 to 2001 is estimated.
Thus we have designed four types of real-time simulations which we apply to
information sets that were available to policymakers when attempting to predict the
adequate policy reaction for short-term interest rates from 1991 to 2001. The real-time
forecast errors, measured in means, variance and mean square errors (MSE) of the
short-term interest rate are reported in Tables 3.
These real-time simulations reflect the decision of a policymaking institution that
needs to fix the short-term interest rate in late autumn for the next year. The results
seem to be quite revealing:
In the case of expanding samples as reported in Table 3a, e.g. for the United
States, interest rates were set too low over the period under consideration by about 30
basis points in the unadjusted sample. Adjusting the sample leads to a reduction of this
policy error to about 8 basis points, though the variance increases.
In the case of moving samples as reported in Table 3b, we observe again a
reduction of the predicted short-term interest rate forecasts from an underestimation of
84 basis points to an overestimation of 46 basis points, but a substantial reduction in
variance that that also reduces the mean square error.15
With only two exceptions (USA and Italy) out of 14 simulations, instead of using
unadjusted samples the switch to adjusted samples substantially improves the forecast
performance as observed in the decline of the mean square error.
Switching to moving samples improves in eight out of 14 simulations the forecast
performance. The reason for this improvement seems to be the handling of structural
changes by flexible fixed size samples instead of increasing samples.
Table 3a:  Real-time simulation of Taylor rules using expanding samples
  estimated with dated data values
Source: Own calculations based on data from OECD Economic Outlook, sample starts 1980 and expands
from 1991 to 2001.
Table 3b:  Real-time simulation of Taylor rules using moving samples
  estimated with dated data values
Source: Own calculations based on data from OECD Economic Outlook, moving 11 year sample start
with1980-1990 and move to 1991–2001.
Being aware of the fact that different samples may yield different results from the
real-time simulations, we performed on the OECD data set a ranking of the four
different sampling strategies for dealing with dated information in the context of Taylor
Mean Variance MSE Mean Variance MSE
USA 0,330 1,065 1,174 0,080 3,300 3,306
Japan -1,780 4,283 7,451 -1,097 1,527 2,730
Germany -0,067 2,865 2,869 -0,615 1,060 1,438
United Kingdom -2,392 6,674 12,396 -1,138 2,811 4,106
France -0,841 4,816 5,523 -0,819 2,066 2,737
Italy -1,491 3,455 5,678 -0,888 3,113 3,902
Canada -0,987 3,672 4,646 -1,472 1,503 3,670
Unadjusted Sample  Adjusted Sample 
Mean Variance MSE Mean Variance MSE
USA 0,843 5,703 6,414 -0,458 2,965 3,175
Japan 0,730 1,482 2,015 -0,526 1,111 1,388
Germany 0,574 2,087 2,416 -0,603 0,536 0,900
United Kingdom -0,559 8,516 8,828 0,022 7,422 7,422
France 0,239 7,898 7,955 -0,840 2,619 3,325
Italy -1,398 3,059 5,013 -1,243 3,817 5,362
Canada -0,406 9,827 9,992 -0,622 4,424 4,811
Unadjusted Sample  Adjusted Sample 16
rule based interest rate decisions. Table 4 lists this ranking according to the mean square
error for ex-ante interest rate forecasts.





























































Source: Own calculations based on data from OECD Economic Outlook.
Data are “adjusted” if they are modified according to the estimated error model, otherwise they are
“unadjusted”. Samples are “expanding” if the sample size increases or “moving” if the sample size is kept
constant.
4.  Conclusions
We started from the assertion that a useful monetary policy design should be
founded on more realistic assumptions about what policymakers can know at the time
when policy decisions have to be made.
Since the Taylor rule – if used as an operational device - implies a forward
looking behaviour, we analyze the reliability of the input information. We use OECD
forecasts for inflation and GDP growth rates and investigate the forecasting
performance for these variables. We diagnose a much better forecasting record for17
inflation rates compared to GDP growth rates, which for most countries are almost
uninformative at the time a Taylor rule should sensibly be applied. Using this data set,
we find significant differences between Taylor rules estimated over revised ex-post data
and over real-time data and there is evidence that monetary policy seems to react more
actively in real time than rules estimated over revised data suggest.
Since the OECD forecasts for GDP growth rates exhibit systematic errors, in a
next step we attempted to correct for these forecast biases and checked to which extent
this can lower the errors in interest rate policy setting. An ex-ante simulation for the
years 1991 to 2001 supports the proposal that correcting for forecast errors and biases
based on an error model can lower the resulting policy error in interest rate setting for
most countries under consideration. In addition we investigated to what extent structural
changes in the policy reaction behaviour can be handled with moving instead of
expanding samples.
Generally, our analysis supports critics and sceptics of the Taylor rule who argue
that a mechanical application of this rule will not be appropriate and should at least be
accompanied by a careful examination of a broad set of additional information.
Svensson (2003) presented a long list of what may be wrong with the Taylor rule.
Our results additionally point out the fact that the informational basis needs a careful
examination. Limited forecast quality and significant data revisions recommend a more
sophisticated handling of the dated information for which we present an operational
procedure that has the potential of reducing the risk of severe policy errors.18
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ANNEX
Table A.1 Error analysis of GDP
Mean of errors of estimates
2 y. ahead
end mid end mid end mid end mid end
U S A 0 , 3 20 , 3 50 , 4 10 , 2 70 , 3 80 , 3 40 , 3 40 , 3 60 , 3 2
JPN -0,71 -0,25 -0,36 -0,07 -0,15 -0,30 -0,30 -0,35 0,04
DEU -0,76 -0,60 -0,10 0,06 0,07 0,04 -0,03 -0,04 0,05
FRA -0,72 -0,36 -0,14 -0,09 0,09 0,04 -0,01 -0,03 0,13
ITA -0,73 -0,49 0,13 0,28 0,53 0,44 0,49 0,49 0,08
GBR -0,15 0,36 0,28 0,60 0,61 0,55 0,41 0,36 0,21
CAN -0,65 -0,44 0,11 0,23 0,47 0,40 0,39 0,36
Root mean square of errors of estimates
2 y. ahead
end mid end mid end mid end mid end
U S A 1 , 5 81 , 6 91 , 3 71 , 0 10 , 8 60 , 7 90 , 6 40 , 6 40 , 5 5
J P N 2 , 1 21 , 9 82 , 2 41 , 6 91 , 2 11 , 0 81 , 1 20 , 9 60 , 6 6
D E U 1 , 9 21 , 7 31 , 5 20 , 9 90 , 7 90 , 6 70 , 6 80 , 6 90 , 3 7
FRA 1,77 1,54 1,22 1,00 0,75 0,63 0,53 0,51 0,40
I T A 1 , 5 01 , 3 81 , 7 71 , 3 61 , 0 80 , 8 40 , 8 50 , 9 10 , 2 4
GBR 1,30 1,43 1,49 0,94 0,93 0,80 0,68 0,66 0,47
C A N 1 , 8 62 , 1 21 , 5 81 , 1 01 , 0 10 , 7 70 , 7 40 , 7 0
 Standard deviation of errors of estimates
2 y. ahead
end mid end mid end mid end mid end
U S A 1 , 6 01 , 6 21 , 4 70 , 8 50 , 7 70 , 7 00 , 4 90 , 4 80 , 4 7
J P N 2 , 0 61 , 9 31 , 3 40 , 7 40 , 9 90 , 7 60 , 7 60 , 5 90 , 5 9
D E U 1 , 8 21 , 7 31 , 4 10 , 9 10 , 7 20 , 5 70 , 5 50 , 5 40 , 4 8
FRA 1,67 1,60 1,15 0,72 0,57 0,48 0,50 0,46 0,44
I T A 1 , 2 71 , 2 20 , 8 40 , 6 70 , 4 70 , 2 60 , 2 70 , 2 30 , 2 3
G B R 1 , 3 31 , 2 61 , 1 40 , 7 90 , 5 40 , 3 90 , 3 80 , 3 90 , 4 0
C A N 1 , 7 91 , 8 71 , 7 61 , 1 90 , 7 40 , 5 80 , 4 80 , 4 8
1 year ahead current year 1 year after 2 years after
1 year ahead current year 1 year after 2 years after
1 year ahead current year 1 year after 2 years after21
Table A.2 Error analysis of consumer prices
Mean of errors of estimates
2 y. ahead
end mid end mid end mid end mid end
USA -0,55 -0,63 -0,28 -0,07 0,03 0,09 0,01 -0,03 -0,10
JPN -0,53 -0,63 -0,36 -0,21 -0,06 0,03 0,01 0,02 -0,02
DEU -0,12 -0,24 -0,09 -0,11 -0,13 -0,12 -0,09 -0,09 -0,15
FRA 0,00 -0,01 0,14 0,04 0,06 0,22 0,21 0,22 0,20
I T A 0 , 8 80 , 6 40 , 9 20 , 4 00 , 3 10 , 2 10 , 2 00 , 1 90 , 2 1
GBR 0,03 -0,03 -0,02 0,15 0,45 0,44 0,40 0,44 0,34
CAN -0,40 -0,34 -0,10 -0,07 0,09 0,12 0,09 0,09
Root mean square of errors of estimates
2 y. ahead
end mid end mid end mid end mid end
U S A 1 , 0 11 , 0 11 , 0 10 , 3 10 , 3 70 , 3 70 , 3 70 , 3 70 , 3 8
J P N 0 , 9 21 , 1 20 , 9 60 , 7 70 , 7 10 , 6 30 , 6 30 , 5 70 , 5 9
D E U 0 , 8 01 , 0 10 , 9 10 , 6 00 , 5 40 , 4 80 , 4 80 , 4 00 , 4 1
FRA 0,62 0,80 0,87 0,51 0,36 0,38 0,39 0,53 0,30
I T A 1 , 4 51 , 1 61 , 6 70 , 8 40 , 5 80 , 4 70 , 4 80 , 4 20 , 3 5
G B R 1 , 3 31 , 2 71 , 2 81 , 1 90 , 8 80 , 7 90 , 6 90 , 6 90 , 6 3
C A N 1 , 2 31 , 1 21 , 0 20 , 8 40 , 6 70 , 5 70 , 5 80 , 4 4
 Standard deviation of errors of estimates
2 y. ahead
end mid end mid end mid end mid end
U S A 0 , 8 80 , 6 00 , 8 30 , 3 10 , 3 00 , 2 60 , 2 30 , 2 60 , 3 1
J P N 0 , 7 00 , 7 90 , 8 00 , 6 30 , 5 10 , 5 10 , 5 00 , 5 20 , 5 2
D E U 0 , 5 80 , 6 40 , 5 80 , 3 80 , 3 70 , 4 20 , 4 40 , 4 30 , 4 3
FRA 0,65 0,55 0,54 0,32 0,32 0,25 0,27 0,21 0,19
I T A 1 , 1 91 , 0 10 , 9 20 , 3 60 , 4 20 , 3 00 , 3 10 , 2 40 , 2 6
G B R 1 , 3 81 , 3 70 , 9 71 , 1 30 , 8 80 , 7 90 , 6 60 , 6 40 , 6 4
C A N 0 , 8 10 , 5 10 , 5 30 , 4 40 , 3 60 , 3 30 , 3 00 , 3 0
1 year ahead current year 1 year after 2 years after
1 year ahead current year 1 year after 2 years after
1 year ahead current year 1 year after 2 years after22
Table A.3a Error model for GDP
USA GDP
b 1 t 1 b 0 t 0
2 ys. ahead (end)  -0,03 0,1 3,00 2,1 0,000 1,48
1 y.  ahead  (mid)  1,05 2,2 0,21 0,2 0,191 1,36
1 y.  ahead  (end)  0,89 7,2 0,71 1,8 0,587 1,94
Current year (mid) 0,83 12,0 0,75 3,1 0,804 1,78
Current year (end) 0,85 16,3 0,78 4,3 0,883 1,74
1 y.  after  (mid)  0,87 17,5 0,69 4,0 0,900 1,48
1 y.  after  (end)  0,87 24,5 0,67 5,3 0,947 1,69
2 ys. after (mid) 0,89 24,3 0,65 5,0 0,947 1,74
JAPAN GDP
b 1 t 1 b 0 t 0
2 ys. ahead (end)  0,17 0,4 1,44 1,3 0,012 1,03
1 y.  ahead  (mid)  0,41 1,3 1,37 1,4 0,071 1,09
1 y.  ahead  (end)  0,83 7,1 0,39 0,6 0,584 1,78
Current year (mid) 0,83 11,1 0,63 1,6 0,779 1,87
Current year (end) 0,81 20,1 0,64 2,8 0,920 1,70
1 y.  after  (mid)  0,82 26,5 0,51 2,8 0,954 1,95
1 y.  after  (end)  0,81 25,5 0,53 2,8 0,950 1,91
2 ys. after (mid) 0,86 26,8 0,30 1,6 0,956 1,93
GERMANY GDP
b 1 t 1 b 0 t 0
2 ys. ahead (end)  -0,78 0,9 3,89 1,6 0,050 1,26
1 y.  ahead  (mid)  -0,06 0,1 2,02 1,2 0,000 1,05
1 y.  ahead  (end)  1,00 5,2 -0,09 0,5 0,428 1,64
Current year (mid) 0,88 10,7 0,33 1,4 0,769 1,94
Current year (end) 0,81 17,2 0,48 3,1 0,898 1,98
1 y.  after  (mid)  0,85 19,1 0,38 2,6 0,915 1,8
1 y.  after  (end)  0,84 19,5 0,35 2,5 0,919 1,71
2 ys. after (mid) 0,83 18,8 0,38 2,5 0,914 1,64
UNITED KINGDOM
b 1 t 1 b 0 t 0
2 ys. ahead (end)  0,93 1,3 0,01 0,0 0,108 1,22
1 y.  ahead  (mid)  0,59 1,2 1,28 1,1 0,068 0,86
1 y.  ahead  (end)  0,82 5,0 0,67 1,6 0,408 1,45
Current year (mid) 1,04 14,3 0,53 3,0 0,853 1,84
Current year (end) 0,93 15,3 0,74 4,7 0,871 1,83
1 y.  after  (mid)  1,03 18,4 0,50 3,5 0,909 2,57
1 y.  after  (end)  1,02 19,7 0,36 2,6 0,919 2,96
2 ys. after (mid) 1,01 19,2 0,34 2,4 0,918 3,17
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Table A.3b Error model for GDP (continued)
FRANCE
b 1 t 1 b 0 t 0
2 ys. ahead (end)  -1,78 2,5 6,67 3,4 0,287 1,14
1 y.  ahead  (mid)  -0,38 0,8 2,95 2,6 0,035 0,93
1 y.  ahead  (end)  0,85 6,2 0,29 0,7 0,516 1,50
Current year (mid) 0,75 10,2 0,60 2,4 0,747 1,25
Current year (end) 0,86 21,1 0,38 2,8 0,929 1,21
1 y.  after  (mid)  0,81 18,3 0,55 3,6 0,908 1,45
1 y.  after  (end)  0,80 15,0 0,60 3,4 0,936 1,22
2 ys. after (mid) 0,85 22,8 0,37 2,8 0,945 0,91
2 ys. after (end) 0,93 10,1 0,26 1,3 0,879 1,12
ITALY GDP
b 1 t 1 b 0 t 0
2 ys. ahead (end)  -1,06 1,3 4,46 2,2 0,100 1,21
1 y.  ahead  (mid)  -0,02 0,1 1,88 2,0 0,000 1,16
1 y.  ahead  (end)  0,69 5,1 0,95 2,1 0,416 1,42
Current year (mid) 0,88 7,7 0,57 1,6 0,627 1,74
Current year (end) 0,88 12,7 0,76 3,5 0,821 1,61
1 y.  after  (mid)  0,97 16,5 0,49 2,6 0,889 1,12
1 y.  after  (end)  0,95 17,3 0,58 3,3 0,898 1,20
2 ys. after (mid) 0,89 15,8 0,75 4,0 0,883 1,39
CANADA
b 1 t 1 b 0 t 0
2 ys. ahead (end)  1,23 1,8 -1,39 0,6 0,185 1,22
1 y.  ahead  (mid)  0,92 1,6 -0,18 0,1 0,110 1,24
1 y.  ahead  (end)  1,10 5,1 -0,21 0,3 0,423 2,09
Current year (mid) 1,03 9,8 0,12 0,3 0,734 1,75
Current year (end) 0,87 13,4 0,84 3,6 0,837 1,38
1 y.  after  (mid)  0,93 18,0 0,60 3,2 0,905 1,31
1 y.  after  (end)  0,94 19,0 0,58 3,2 0,914 1,34
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Table A.4a Error model for consumer prices
USA Consumer Prices
b 1 t 1 b 0 t 0
2 ys. ahead (end)  0,65 3,9 0,47 0,9 0,525 1,25
1 y.  ahead  (mid)  0,67 8,6 0,51 1,7 0,780 1,65
1 y.  ahead  (end)  0,93 11,7 -0,03 0,1 0,850 1,21
Current year (mid) 1,02 41,9 -0,16 1,5 0,987 1,63
Current year (end) 1,02 34,1 -0,07 0,5 0,980 1,48
1 y.  after  (mid)  1,06 33,2 -0,10 0,7 0,979 1,27
1 y.  after  (end)  1,06 32,2 -0,20 1,3 0,977 1,32
2 ys. after (mid) 1,06 31,3 -0,25 1,6 0,977 1,57
JAPAN Consumer Prices
b 1 t 1 b 0 t 0
2 ys. ahead (end)  0,89 6,2 -0,46 2,3 0,731 1,20
1 y.  ahead  (mid)  0,74 8,0 -0,30 1,6 0,750 2,19
1 y.  ahead  (end)  0,91 12,4 -0,23 1,2 0,865 2,82
Current year (mid) 0,94 18,0 -0,13 0,9 0,931 1,96
Current year (end) 1,07 17,7 -0,14 1,0 0,929 1,52
1 y.  after  (mid)  0,99 20,7 0,32 0,2 0,947 1,56
1 y.  after  (end)  1,04 20,4 -0,01 0,8 0,945 1,64
2 ys. after (mid) 1,02 19,0 0,01 0,1 0,940 1,68
GERMANY Consumer Prices
b 1 t 1 b 0 t 0
2 ys. ahead (end)  1,03 5,8 -0,20 0,5 0,707 1,72
1 y.  ahead  (mid)  0,91 4,9 -0,06 0,1 0,537 1,52
1 y.  ahead  (end)  1,19 8,9 -0,57 1,5 0,760 1,53
Current year (mid) 1,10 16,1 -0,37 1,9 0,915 1,72
Current year (end) 1,00 19,9 -0,14 0,9 0,943 1,94
1 y.  after  (mid)  0,98 19,3 -0,11 0,7 0,940 1,89
1 y.  after  (end)  0,97 18,7 -0,03 0,2 0,936 1,72
2 ys. after (mid) 0,97 18,7 -0,05 0,3 0,938 1,67
UNITED KINGDOM Consumer Prices
b 1 t 1 b 0 t 0
2 ys. ahead (end)  1,65 5,9 -2,12 2,2 0,711 1,68
1 y.  ahead  (mid)  0,92 6,2 0,31 0,5 0,649 0,78
1 y.  ahead  (end)  1,06 13,5 -0,33 0,7 0,884 1,06
Current year (mid) 0,92 15,2 0,52 1,3 0,906 1,66
Current year (end) 1,03 24,1 0,29 1,1 0,960 1,28
1 y.  after  (mid)  1,02 31,1 0,30 1,4 0,976 1,77
1 y.  after  (end)  0,99 35,0 0,41 2,2 0,981 1,93
2 ys. after (mid) 0,99 36,3 0,47 2,5 0,983 1,47
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Table A.4b Error model for consumer prices (continued)
FRANCE Consumer Prices
b 1 t 1 b 0 t 0
2 ys. ahead (end)  1,23 4,4 -0,44 0,8 0,579 1,17
1 y.  ahead  (mid)  0,91 16,7 0,28 1,2 0,930 2,31
1 y.  ahead  (end)  1,04 22,8 -0,58 0,2 0,956 1,98
Current year (mid) 0,98 39,0 0,12 0,8 0,984 2,41
Current year (end) 0,99 55,7 0,79 0,7 0,992 1,69
1 y.  after  (mid)  0,99 0,2 0,24 2,6 0,995 1,82
1 y.  after  (end)  1,01 62,5 0,12 1,2 0,994 1,23
2 ys. after (mid) 1,01 64,1 0,12 1,2 0,994 1,31
ITALY Consumer Prices
b 1 t 1 b 0 t 0
2 ys. ahead (end)  0,94 4,4 1,09 1,4 0,575 1,48
1 y.  ahead  (mid)  0,94 18,3 0,96 2,8 0,941 2,33
1 y.  ahead  (end)  1,09 19,2 0,37 0,8 0,939 0,86
Current year (mid) 0,96 37,0 0,69 2,9 0,983 2,52
Current year (end) 0,98 54,6 0,45 2,7 0,992 1,72
1 y.  after  (mid)  0,98 53,0 0,30 1,6 0,992 1,58
1 y.  after  (end)  0,99 63,5 0,21 1,3 0,994 1,74
2 ys. after (mid) 0,99 71,3 0,22 1,6 0,995 2,08
CANADA Consumer Prices
b 1 t 1 b 0 t 0
2 ys. ahead (end)  0,69 5,5 0,40 1,1 0,683 1,26
1 y.  ahead  (mid)  0,83 13,3 0,24 0,9 0,894 1,45
1 y.  ahead  (end)  1,04 18,7 -0,24 0,9 0,936 1,20
Current year (mid) 0,98 24,7 0,52 0,3 0,962 1,68
Current year (end) 0,97 39,7 0,20 1,6 0,985 2,18
1 y.  after  (mid)  0,96 37,0 0,34 2,4 0,983 1,78
1 y.  after  (end)  0,95 35,7 0,38 2,7 0,982 1,60
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